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I.  STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case started with the Respondents’ John S. Kirby and Vicki L. Kirby (“Kirbys”) 
verified complaint for trespass, nuisance, negligence, and injunctive relief filed against the 
Appellants’ Mark Scotton and Dawn Scotton (“Scottons”). The Scottons control an irrigation 
easement over their land that for years has continually flooded the Kirbys’ neighboring land with 
excess water. After numerous attempts to get the Scottons to dig a simple ditch on their property 
to prevent further flooding, the Kirbys were forced to file suit. Then, the Scottons and their 
attorney failed to answer the complaint for 72 days after it was due, even after receiving written 
notice of intent to take default, and in fact engaged in three months of delay that the District 
Court found amounted to “dilatory conduct.” The District Court entered default, had a hearing on 
damages, denied the Scottons’ motion to set aside the default, and entered a default judgment.  
B.  Course of proceedings in District Court 
 The Kirbys’ complaint was filed on July 8, 2016. (R. 2, 7). The Scottons were served on 
August 31, 2016. (R. 2). No answer or notice of appearance was filed by the deadline under 
I.R.C.P. 12. (R. 2). The Kirbys moved for entry of default and a default judgment on October 24, 
2016. (R. 2). The District Court ultimately entered default on November 18, 2016. (R. 3, 19). 
The Scottons filed an answer on December 1, 2016 and then moved to set aside the entry 
of default. (R. 3) The District Court held a hearing on default damages on December 15, 2016, 
but held the decision in abeyance until it could decide the Scottons’ motion to set aside the entry 
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of default. (R. 3, 69). On January 19, 2017, the Court heard that motion and issued a written 
Order Denying Set Aside of Default denying the motion to set aside default on February 21, 
2017. (R. 4, 81-83). On the same day, the Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Default Damages and entered a Final Judgment awarding the Kirbys $10,952.23, and other 
relief. (R. 4, 69, 76). 
C.  Statement of Facts 
The Scottons’ recitation of the facts leading up to the entry of default glosses over key 
events and ignores what the District Court correctly found was “dilatory conduct.”  
The complaint in this case was filed on July 8, 2016. (R. 2, 7). On July 14th, 2016 Kirbys’ 
counsel sent a copy of the Complaint along with an acceptance of service to Trevor Hart. (R. 54). 
Mr. Hart had previously communicated with the Kirbys’ counsel on behalf of the Scottons 
regarding the underlying dispute. (R. 34). Mr. Hart never confirmed his representation by 
returning a signed acceptance of service. (R. 54). After no return of the acceptance of service, the 
Kirbys had the Scottons personally served with the complaint on August 31, 2016. (R. 54). 
After service of the complaint, the Scottons never filed an answer, nor did Mr. Hart or 
any other attorney file a notice of appearance on behalf of the Scottons. (R. 2-3). After waiting 
24 days, the Kirbys filed a motion for entry of default and sent the default filings directly to the 
Scottons as no confirmation from Mr. Hart had been received that he was in fact representing the 
Scottons in the case. (R. 17-18). In response to that motion, Mr. Hart emailed the Kirbys’ 
counsel on October 27, 2016 and requested the motion for default be withdrawn. (R. 51). Kirbys’ 
counsel agreed and gave notice to Mr. Hart, in writing, that he had until November 4, 2016 to file 
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an answer. (R. 58). That same day her office emailed the clerk of the District Court. (R. 59). That 
email, on which Mr. Hart was copied, stated: “Please withdraw our Motion for Entry of Default 
against Mr. and Mrs. Scotton. We are in negotiation to secure an answer to our complaint. The 
answer will be filed next week sometime or if not we will refile our Motion for Entry of 
Default.” (R. 59). 
On November 4, 2016, no answer being received, despite the one week written notice 
given Mr. Hart, Scottons’ counsel’s office contacted the clerk of the District Court indicating the 
desire to proceed with the default and inquiring about the procedure for renewing the request for 
default, specifically if she would need to “refile” the documents. (R. 60). The clerk indicated the 
previous documents would be provided to the District Court. (R. 60). Default was ultimately 
entered on November 18, 2016.  (R. 19).  
From July 14 to August 31, 2016, Scottons’ counsel failed to return a signed acceptance 
of service. From August 31, 2016 onwards, Scottons knew they had been personally served and 
had to answer the Complaint, yet no notice of appearance or answer was filed. From October 
24th, 2016 onwards, Scottons’ counsel was aware the Kirbys were seeking default, yet filed no 
notice of appearance or answer. On October 27th, 2016, Scottons’ counsel was given one weeks’ 
notice of intent to take default. (R. 58, 59). Yet, it was not until after default was entered on 
November 18, 2016 that an answer was filed. Even then, the answer was not filed until 
December 1, 2016, 72 days after an answer was due. 
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II.  ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL 
 As an additional issue on appeal, the Kirbys request their attorney’s fees and costs on 
appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41. This is more fully discussed in Section 
IV.D below. 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On appeal, this Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion to set aside an entry of 
default for an abuse of discretion. McGloon v. Gwynn, 140 Idaho 727, 729, 100 P.3d 621, 623 
(2004) (citing McFarland v. Curtis, 123 Idaho 931, 933, 854 P.2d 274, 276 (Ct. App. 1993)); see 
also AgStar Financial Services, ACA v. Gordon Paving Co., Inc., 161 Idaho 817, 391 P.3d 1287 
(2017). Such a denial will not be reversed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion clearly 
appears. Id. “The power of a trial court to grant or deny relief under Rule 55(c) is discretionary.” 
Id. (citing Clear Springs Trout Co. v. Anthony, 123 Idaho 141, 143, 845 P.2d 559, 561 (1992)). 
“Where the trial court makes factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, applies correct 
criteria pursuant to I.R.C.P. 55(c) to those facts, and makes a logical conclusion, the court will 
have acted within its discretion.” Id.   
IV.  ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Denying the Scottons’ 
Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default 
The District Court acted well within its discretion in denying the Scottons’ motion to set 
aside entry of default and its decision should be affirmed. The District Court reviewed the 
procedural history of the case, the Scottons’ motion to set aside the default and briefs in support 
and opposition, and all the affidavits, took the matter under advisement, and issued a written 
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decision denying the motion to set aside the entry of default. That decision stated and applied the 
correct legal standards. The Scottons have not demonstrated any of the factual findings were 
clearly erroneous and have failed to meet their burden.  
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), “The court may set aside an entry of ... 
default for good cause, and it may set aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b).” I.R.C.P. 55     
(c). One of the requirements of showing good cause is that the party asking the Court to set aside 
default must also plead facts with particularity, which, if established, would constitute a defense 
to the action. Bach v. Miller, 148 Idaho 549, 224 P.3d 1138 (2010); Dorion v. Keane, 153 Idaho 
371, 283 P.3d 118 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing Idaho State Police ex rel. Russell v. Parcel I: Lot 2 in 
Block 3, 144 Idaho 60, 63, 156 P.3d 561, 546 (2007)). “Because judgments by default are not 
favored, a trial court should grant relief in doubtful cases in order to decide the case on the 
merits.” Jonsson v. Oxborrow, 141 Idaho 635, 638, 115 P.3d 726, 729 (2005). “[T]he required 
good cause showing to set aside a default under Rule 55(c) is ‘lower or more lenient than that 
required to set aside a default judgment” under Rule 60(b).’” Dorion, 153 Idaho at 375, 283 P.3d 
at 122 (quoting McFarland v. Curtis, 123 Idaho 931, 936, 854 P.2d 274, 279 (Ct. App. 1993)). 
The Court of Appeals has also ruled that whether the default was willful or whether 
setting it aside would be prejudicial to the opposing party are “[o]ther primary considerations” in 
the good cause analysis. Dorion, 153 Idaho at 374, 283 P.3d at 121. “The weight that a court 
assigns both to the conduct of a party, when that conduct leads to entry of default, and to the 
prejudice that would result to the opposing party if the default were set aside, is left to the 
discretion of the trial court.” Id. at 375, 283 P.3d at 122. 
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1. The District Court correctly entered default based upon the Scottons’ 
dilatory conduct 
 
The District Court found that the Scottons did not make a showing of “good cause” 
needed to set aside the entry of default and that Scottons’ conduct in failing to respond to the 
complaint was dilatory. (R. 82). The District Court concluded that the delay “amounted to 
dilatory conduct for more than three months.” (R. 83). The District Court found that the Scottons 
failed “to accept service through their attorney, file a notice of appearance, motion to extend time 
to answer, or answer between July 19, 2016 and November 4, 2016.” (R. 82). The District Court 
found that “[t]he Defendants had repeated opportunities to accept service or appear in this 
litigation over an extended period of time. The delay is beyond just engaging in settlement 
negotiations and amounts to dilatory conduct for more than three months.” (R. 82-83). 
These findings are amply supported by the record. The District Court summarized what 
occurred in its decision: 
Defense counsel sent a letter to Plaintiffs’ counsel in May 2016. Counsel for the 
Plaintiffs had a conversation with the attorney believed to be the counsel for the 
Defendants on July 13, 2016. The Complaint was delivered to that attorney for the 
Defendants about July 14, 2016 but the acceptance of service was not signed by 
defense counsel. No answer was filed pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
12 and no notice of general or special appearance was filed under Rule 4.1. While 
counsel for the plaintiffs and defendants may have engaged in settlement 
discussions at that time, nothing was ever filed with the court. Then, the 
Complaint was served on the Scottons on August 31, 2016—well after the time 
Plaintiff's counsel would have returned from vacation. Still, after formal service 
no answer was filed pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12 and no notice of 
general or special appearance was filed under Rule 4.1. No motion to extend time 
to answer was filed. The application for default was filed October 24, 2016. On 
October 27, 2016, counsel for the Defendants admits he was aware of the default 
application but, still nothing was filed with the court. The court entered default on 
November 17, 2016. The Defendants then filed an untimely answer on December 
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1, 2016 and a Motion to Set Aside the Default on December 6, 2016. The Answer 
is more of a general denial and does not plead with particularity and detail the 
defenses. 
 
(R. 82). 
The record contains substantial evidence of a desire to simply delay the case as long as 
possible. Over four months elapsed from the time Mr. Hart was provided the complaint with an 
acceptance of service, (R. 34), to the time he filed an answer on behalf of the Scottons (thirteen 
days after entry of default). (R. 21). Even after being personally served, the Scottons failed to file 
a notice of appearance or answer with the Court for over three months. (R. 2-3).  
Although the District Court entered default largely because of the Scottons’ dilatory 
conduct, the Scottons argue on appeal that the District Court “did not consider willfulness in 
denying Scottons’ motion.” (Appellants’ Br. at 6). Instead, according to the Scottons, the District 
Court “ruled that Scottons’ mere tardiness created a lack of good cause to set aside the default.” 
(Appellants’ Br. at 6-7).  
First, that is a gross mischaracterization of the District Court’s Order Denying Set Aside 
of Default. Rather, the Court’s Order recounted in detail the repeated failure of the Scottons to 
act diligently in response to the Kirbys’ lawsuit. (R. 82-83). Nowhere did the Court hold the 
problem was one of mere tardiness. The District Court found a pattern of unexcused delay in 
answering the complaint that amounted to “dilatory conduct.” (R. 82-83). That conclusion is 
indistinguishable from a finding that the failure to answer was willful. The plain meaning of 
“dilatory” is “designed or tending to cause delay.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), 
RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF  Page 8 
 
dilatory (giving as an example of how “dilatory” is used in a sentence: “the judge’s opinion 
criticized the lawyer’s persistent dilatory tactics”).    
Second, in support of their argument, the Scottons cite several federal cases that are 
factually far afield from what occurred in this case. In Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Right Solution 
Med. Supply, Inc., No. 12 Civ 0908, 2012 WL 6617422, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2012) 
(unreported), the plaintiff obtained entry of default against one defendant one day after the 
deadline for an answer, and two days after the deadline for the other defendant. The court 
understandably held “mere tardiness in meeting a court deadline does not establish a willful 
default.”  In AIP Asset Mgmt. Inc. v. Ascension Tech. Grp. Ltd., No. 16 CIV. 9181 (LLS), 2017 
WL 448963, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2017), the plaintiff obtained entry of default within days of 
an answer being due, after defendants’ counsel had filed a notice of appearance and had 
requested an extension of time to respond to the complaint. In Moreno-Godoy v. Gallet Dreyer & 
Berkey, LLP, No. 14 CIV. 7082 PAE, 2015 WL 5737565, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015) 
(unreported), the defendant did not answer, but never received any notice of intent to take 
default, and failed to appear because he believed a co-defendant was representing his interests. 
None of these cases have facts that resemble what occurred here. Even after being 
personally served, the Scottons failed to file a notice of appearance or answer with the Court for 
over three months. (R. 2-3). There was no rush to the courthouse to obtain a default. The 
Scottons were served with the default filings, given more time to answer, yet still failed to do so. 
The facts substantially support the District Court’s conclusion that the Defendants had failed to 
show the requisite “good cause” in failing to timely answer the complaint.  
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2. The Scottons were provided a weeks’ written notice of intent to take 
default, yet still failed to answer the complaint 
 
Further, the Scottons failed to file an answer or notice of appearance even after being 
given notice of Kirbys’ intent to seek a default. The District Court specifically noted that “On 
October 27, 2016, counsel for the Defendants admits he was aware of the default application but, 
still, nothing was filed with the court.” (R. 82). Scottons’ counsel was specifically given written 
notice via emails on October 27, 2016 that absent an answer filed by November 4th, default 
would be sought. (R. 58, 59). The District Court acknowledged this one-week notice when it 
found that the Defendants had failed to “. . . accept service through their attorney, to file a notice 
of appearance, motion to extend time to answer, or answer between July 19, 2016 and November 
4, 2016.” (R. 82). Scottons’ counsel does not deny he received the notice. (R. 27). Yet, still no 
answer or notice of appearance was filed in the time given by Kirbys’ counsel, which exceeded 
the three days required by the Rule. (R. 2-3). In fact, default was not entered for 22 days after the 
Scottons’ counsel was informed in writing he had a week to file an answer. (R. 19). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a)(1) states that “if a party has appeared in the action, 
that party must be served with 3 days’ written notice of the application for entry of default before 
default may be entered.” I.R.C.P. 55(a) (1). “[T]he appearance required to trigger the three-day 
notice requirement has been broadly defined, and is not limited to a formal court appearance.” 
Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 288, 221 P.3d 81, 86 (2009). “A defendant who merely 
‘indicates an intent to defend against the action’ can benefit from the notice requirement. Id. 
(quoting Catledge v. Transport Tire Co., 107 Idaho 602, 606, 691 P.2d 1217, 1221 (1984)). To 
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constitute an appearance, the “defendant’s actions ‘must be responsive to plaintiff's formal 
[c]ourt action,’ so it is insufficient to simply be interested in the dispute or to communicate to the 
plaintiff an unwillingness to comply with the requested relief.” Id. (quoting Baez v. S.S. Kresge 
Co., 518 F.2d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (holding that there has not been an 
appearance merely because the plaintiff knew the defendant intended to resist the suit); see also 
Ellis v. Ellis, 118 Idaho 468, 472, 797 P.2d 868, 872 (Ct. App.1990) (finding that the defendant 
had not appeared when he rejected the petitioner’s divorce settlement proposal); Olson v. 
Kirkham, 111 Idaho 34, 36, 720 P.2d 217, 219 (Ct. App.1986) (finding that preliminary 
settlement discussions between the parties were not an appearance). 
The Rule does not require any specific form of written notice of intent to seek default. 
Under the analogous federal rule requiring written notice of an application for default judgment, 
“notice of an application for the entry of a default judgment need not be in any particular form. 
The major consideration is that the party is made aware that a default judgment may be entered 
against him.” 10A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2687 (4th ed.). A court is within its discretion to 
enter default and a default judgment where a party has received at least three days’ notice of 
intent to take default yet failed to answer, and showed no meritorious defense. See Reeves v. 
Wisenor, 102 Idaho 271, 629 P.2d 667 (1981). “The purpose of requiring notice only when the 
defendant has entered an appearance is to protect plaintiffs in instances ‘when the adversary 
process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.’” Meyers v. Hansen, 148 
Idaho 283, 288, 221 P.3d 81, 86 (2009) (quoting Newbold v. Arvidson, 105 Idaho 663, 665, 672 
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P.2d 231, 233 (1983), disapproved of on other grounds by Shelton v. Diamond Intern. Corp., 108 
Idaho 935, 703 P.2d 699 (1985)). 
In Reeves v. Wisenor, this Court affirmed a trial court’s decision to deny relief from a 
default judgment where the defendant had retained an attorney and had engaged in settlement 
discussions with the plaintiff’s counsel. 102 Idaho 271, 271, 629 P.2d 667, 678 (1981). Yet, after 
being provided a week’s notice of intent to take default, defendant failed to appear at the default 
hearing. Id. The trial court entered default and default judgment. Id. This Court affirmed. Id. at 
273, 629 P.2d at 669.  
Just like the defendant in Reeves, the Scottons failed to act diligently when being given 
notice of an application for default. Even assuming for argument’s sake that the Scottons 
appeared in the action under a broad construction of “appearance,” the Scottons had ample notice 
of the Kirbys’ intent to press for a default if their complaint was unanswered. Kirbys’ counsel 
agreed and told Mr. Hart, in writing, that he had until November 4, 2016 to file an answer. (R. 
58). It is undisputed that the Scottons’ counsel and the Scottons personally knew of the Kirbys’ 
intent to take default well in advance of the District Court’s actual entry of default. (R. 27, 58, 
59). 
It is patently unfair for the Scottons to fail to act diligently in response to the lawsuit but 
then accuse the Kirbys of sharp dealing in simply trying to move forward with a lawsuit. Further, 
if Mr. Hart desired to represent the Scottons in this case and make clear the Scottons intended to 
defend, all he had to do was file a notice of appearance or return the acceptance of service. Now 
with this appeal, just the issue of default is being litigated some fifteen months after the filing of 
RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF  Page 12 
 
the lawsuit. The Scottons had obligations to act diligently and promptly and failed to do so, and 
despite having full notice of the Kirbys’ intent to seek default, failed to comply with the 
applicable procedural rules. 
B. The Kirbys would be Prejudiced if Entry of Default were Set Aside 
 
The Scottons argue the District Court failed to address the issue of prejudice when 
rendering its decision. The Scottons further assert that the only prejudice at issue here would 
have been a short delay caused by their untimely filing of their answer.  
First, the fact that the District Court did not expressly address the prejudice to the Kirbys 
is not reversible error. The Scottons do not cite any case, and the Kirbys are not aware of any, 
where this Court has required trial courts to expressly make a finding of prejudice in ruling on a 
motion to set aside a default. Rather, the weight assigned to factors such as the defaulted party’s 
conduct or the prejudice to the other party are left to the discretion of the trial court. See Dorion, 
153 Idaho at 374, 283 P.3d at 121. 
Second, this argument could be made in many cases involving defaults. The Scottons 
ignored their obligations under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. If a party who has been duly 
served with a Summons and Complaint fails to act diligently, that party is at risk of default. It 
cannot try and delay the matter, and then come into court after default and argue there would be 
no prejudice to simply set aside the default and allow a short time to answer. If that is the 
standard, there are no teeth to the various procedural rules governing appearing in an action and 
answering a complaint.  
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Third, the Scottons rely heavily on Dorion v. Keane, 153 Idaho 371, 283 P.3d 118 (Ct. 
App. 2012) to argue that the District Court erred in not considering the issue of prejudice. Dorion 
is distinguishable. In Dorion, the defendants initially appeared and answered the complaint, but 
after fourteen months their attorney withdrew. 153 Idaho at 373, 283 P.3d at 120. Their new 
attorney spoke to the plaintiff’s attorney on August 30 (after the time had expired for the 
defendants to appear) and requested additional time for the defendants to decide whether to 
retain him as their new attorney. Id. On September 1, plaintiff moved for default, which the court 
granted on September 9. Id. On September 17, the defendants’ attorney filed a notice of 
appearance and moved to set aside the default on the grounds that it was a result of a 
miscommunication between the attorneys. Id. 
 There is little resemblance between the facts in Dorion and the facts here. Here, the 
Scottons never appeared or answered prior to the entry of default. The case has not been litigated 
for fourteen months. There was no confusion caused by the withdrawal of an attorney. There was 
no ambiguity over whether default was being sought.  
Rather, this case is about the willful neglect of obligations imposed by the rules. In Clear 
Springs Trout Co. v. Anthony, the Court upheld a default judgment where the defense counsel, 
who repeatedly communicated with plaintiff’s counsel, had filed a motion to dismiss (rather than 
answer) and then withdrew the motion. 123 Idaho 141, 142-43, 845 P.2d 559, 560-61 (1992). 
After three weeks of inaction, plaintiff sent defendant’s counsel a notice of intent take default 
twelve days later. 123 Idaho at 143, 845 P.2d at 561. Defendant failed to appear at the hearing 
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and the trial court entered default. Id. This Court quoted from the trial court’s findings below, 
which stated: 
The civil rules do have meaning and it provides a mechanism to advance cases on 
their merits. However, when one party intentionally neglects the rules then justice 
demands default actions. The factual circumstances of this case require justice and 
justice requires the upholding of the default judgment. 
 
123 Idaho at 144, 845 P.2d at 562.  
In other words, a party must abide by its obligations under rules or risk a default. The 
trial court docket would grind to a halt if parties were permitted to delay matters until default is 
sought and then come to court and argue there would be no prejudice if they are simply now 
allowed to answer and defend the action. Further, the delay in this case is not inconsequential. 
The Scottons failed to answer the complaint until 72 days after it was due, far more time than the 
delay at issue in Clear Springs.  
C. The District Court Correctly Found that the Scottons Failed to Particularly 
Plead a Meritorious Defense Needed to Establish “Good Cause” under Rule 
55(c) 
The District Court correctly found that the Scottons failed to satisfy the meritorious 
defense needed to establish “good cause” under Rule 55(c). The District Court found that the 
Scottons’ answer amounted to a general denial and that the Scottons had failed to plead any 
defenses with particularity. (R. 82). 
The Scottons’ recitation of the meritorious defense requirement in Dorion v. Keane omits 
a key part of the holding. Consistent with this Court’s long-standing case law, the Court of 
Appeals held that to establish a meritorious defense “factual details must be pled with 
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particularity.” Dorion v. Keane, 153 Idaho 371, 283 P.3d 118 (App. 2012) (citing Idaho State 
Police ex rel. Russell v. Parcel I: Lot 2 in Block 3, 144 Idaho 60, 63, 156 P.3d 561, 546 (2007) 
and Bach v. Miller, 148 Idaho 549, 224 P.3d 1138 (2010) (“a party may not rely on an ordinary 
pleading to prove a meritorious defense”); see also Hearst Corp. v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10, 592 
P.2d 66 (1979), disapproved of on other grounds by Shelton v. Diamond Intern. Corp., 108 Idaho 
935, 703 P.2d 699 (1985), (“Once a default has been entered the pleading of defensive matter 
must go beyond the mere notice requirements that would be sufficient if pled before default.”). 
“It would be an idle exercise for the court to set aside a default if there is in fact no real 
justiciable controversy. The defense matters must be detailed.” Idaho State Police ex rel. Russell 
v. Parcel I: Lot 2 in Block 3, 144 Idaho 60, 63, 156 P.3d 561, 546 (2007). “Consequently, where 
no meritorious defense is shown in support of a motion to set aside a default, a court does not 
abuse its discretion in denying the motion.” Bach v. Miller, 148 Idaho 549, 553, 224 P.3d 1138, 
1142 (2010). 
Instead of correctly setting out the applicable law, the Scottons quote Reinwald v. 
Eveland, 119 Idaho 111, 803 P.2d 1017 (Ct. App. 1991) and Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 
198 P.3d 740 (Ct. App. 2008), but those cases simply state that the meritorious defense 
requirement is a question of the sufficiency of the pleading, which does not require a party to 
prove its case, or even submit evidence. But, a party must still plead defenses with particularity. 
That was not done in this case. 
Rather, the District Court correctly held that the answer was simply a general denial and 
general listing of affirmative defenses with little to no factual detail. The Scottons do not point to 
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any specific factual details in their answer that would support any defense to the underlying 
trespass action, much less a plausible defense. They do argue that they pleaded specific facts in 
support of a right to offset. However, the Scottons’ answer only stated the following with respect 
to offset: 
Plaintiffs’ damages, if any, are subject to Defendants’ right of offset resulting 
from Plaintiffs’ wrongful conduct, including trespass, nuisance, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, caused by Plaintiffs’ discharging their firearms in 
the direction of Defendants’ home. 
 
(R. 23).  
This “defense” consists of nothing more than bare assertions and is not pled with 
particularity. Without more factual information, this statement means nothing. It is a non-specific 
theory and reflects nothing more than the Scottons’ “hope.” For a defense to be pled with 
particularity, the pleading must set forth sufficient factual detail that, if proven, would entitle the 
claimant to the relief requested. No such factual detail is remotely present in Scottons’ answer.  
Further, this alleged “defense” is actually an unliquidated and unpled permissive 
counterclaim. It is not a defense to the particular action brought by the Kirbys. The meritorious 
defense factor is addressed to the potential windfall to the plaintiff of avoiding a determination of 
his case on the merits where it appears the defendant has a defense that could defeat the 
plaintiff’s claim. The “meritorious defense” requirement is concerned with the merits of the 
plaintiff’s claims and whether the defendant could prevail against those claims, not whether the 
defendant could assert some other unrelated counterclaim that could still be litigated in a separate 
lawsuit.   
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Here, the Scottons alleged a potential right to “offset” based on claims that are totally 
unrelated to the Kirbys’ central claim of trespass based on overflow of water onto their property. 
A possible counterclaim on an unrelated matter has no bearing on the meritorious defense 
requirement. See Hearst Corp. v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10, 12, 592 P.2d 66, 68 (1979), disapproved 
of on other grounds by Shelton v. Diamond Intern. Corp., 108 Idaho 935, 703 P.2d 699 (1985), 
(noting the defendant had alleged as a defense a possible damage claim for breach of contract but 
that it could not be determined whether the alleged breach of contract would be a compulsory or 
permissive counterclaim); see also Urbana College v. Conway, 502 N.E.2d 675, 678 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1985) (refusing to set aside default where defendant asserted counterclaim on an unrelated 
incident).  
 Further, there is no relevance to the fact that the District Court decided not to award all 
the Kirbys’ damages at the hearing. The meritorious defense requirement focuses on whether 
factual details supporting a defense are pled with particularity. No defenses to the Kirbys 
damages claims were detailed by the Scottons, in their answer or otherwise. Thus, the District 
Court’s ability under Rule 55(b)(2) to have a hearing and “determine the amount of damages” 
before entering a default judgment has no bearing on the meritorious defense requirement for 
setting aside a prior entry of default. 
 D. The Kirbys Should be Awarded their Attorney’s Fees and Costs on Appeal 
 The Kirbys should be awarded their attorney’s fees and costs on appeal. The standard of 
review on this appeal is whether an abuse of discretion “clearly appears.” McGloon v. Gwynn, 
140 Idaho 727, 729, 100 P.3d 621, 623 (2004). “Where the trial court makes factual findings that 
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are not clearly erroneous, applies correct criteria pursuant to I.R.C.P. 55(c) to those facts, and 
makes a logical conclusion, the court will have acted within its discretion.” Id.    
 “An award of attorney fees on appeal is proper under I.C. § 12-121 only if this Court is 
left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and 
without foundation.” Doe v. Roe, 133 Idaho 805, 810, 992 P.2d 1205, 1210 (1999). An award of 
attorney fees is appropriate if the law is well-settled and the appellant has made no substantial 
showing that the court below misapplied the law. Hunt v. Hunt, 137 Idaho 18, 23, 43 P.3d 777, 
782 (2002). This Court recently ruled that it is frivolous and unreasonable to make a continued 
argument without adding any new analysis or authority or bringing into doubt the existing law to 
the issues raised below.  Castrigno v. McQuade, 141 Idaho 93, 98, 106 P.3d 419, 424 (2005). 
Here, the District Court’s decision is supported by substantial facts in the record and is 
not clearly erroneous. The District Court’s factual findings regarding the Scottons’ dilatory 
conduct are supported by the record, particularly in light of the written notice of default that the 
Scottons’ counsel received 22 days before default was actually entered. The Scottons’ appeal 
raises no new issues but simply asks this Court to second-guess a discretionary decision by the 
trial court. As such, the Scottons bring this appeal frivolously, unreasonably, and without 
foundation. The Court should award the Kirbys their attorney’s fees and costs on appeal. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 The Kirbys respectfully request that the judgment of the District Court be affirmed. 
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